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TRADING POSTS IN CYBERSPACE:
INFORMATION MARKETS AND
THE CONSTRUCTION OF
PROPRIETARY RIGHTS
RUTH L. OKEDIJI*
Abstract: Technological innovation is a predominant source of persis-
tent economic growth. Endogenous factors, principally human capital,
financial capital, and government intervention play an important role
in how the innovation process can enhance welfare through the grant
of intellectual property rights. However, the expansive reacts of such
proprietary interests in cyberspace has important implications for how
e-commerce might contribute to overall economic growth. Thus far, the
scope of intellectual property rights in cyberspace has been examined
in isolation from empirical data reflecting how businesses seek to create
value and effectively capture the benefits that the Internet offers over
real-space markets. This Article argues that expansive construction of
intellectual property rights distorts the informational properties of such
rights and reintroduces high search and use costs to transactions in cy-
berspace. It also deters development and use of innovative business
strategies that could generate greater value from e-commerce. Conse-
quently, there is a need for more government intervention in regulating
competition for markets in cyberspace.
INTRODUCTION
It is now an aphorism that information technologies have
significantly affected the social, economic, and political structure of
personal, national, and international relations.' Although there re-
* Edith Kinney Gaylord Presidential Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law,
Norman, Oklahoma. This paper is based on a presentation at the Boston College Law
School Symposium on Intellectual Property. E-commerce, and the Internet, October 18-
19. 2002. I am grateful for the comments of the symposium participants, particularly those
of Graeme Dinwoodie, who served as the principal commentator. I would also like to
thank Maureen O'Rourke for comments on an earlier draft of this article. Jeb Boatman
and Julie Short provided valuable research assistance.
Information technology has radically altered traditional models of production, man-
agement, and governance in firms. The simultaneous elimination of distance and time as
costs or barriers to the movement of factors of production has facilitated the expansion of
businesses across geographic borders as well as less dependence on government actors as
indispensable agents in the creation of global markets. Sec Ruth Gana Okediji, Copyright
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mains some debate over the magnitude of the changes caused by the
Internet,2
 and even lingering skepticism about the fact of any real
change at al1, 3
 the Internet has, at the very least, occasioned intense
scrutiny of the justifications that inform prevailing economic theories
pertaining to the regulatory function of government and, conse-
quently, market structures. Prior to the Internet's emergence as an
important subject of economic analysis s 4
 a significant body of eco-
and Public Welfare in Global Perspective, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STun. 117, 117-18 (1999)
(describing features of globalization); see also id., at 117 n.2. Fundamentally, the phenome-
non of globalization reflects a transition from land, capital, labor, and entrepreneur as
basic production factors to information, technology, and skilled labor. Consequently, mul-
tinational corporate alliances have assumed increasingly powerful roles, both formal and
informal, that largely determine the substance of legal regimes that regulate the global
economy. The internationalization of intellectual property is paradigmatic of this phe-
nomenon, but the influence of multinational corporations in other regulatory areas is
evident in both national and international settings. See, e.g., Jeff Gerih, Where Business Rules:
Forging Global Regulations That Put Industry Fiat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1998, at D2. On the
"public" law side, there has also been a significant rise in the number and influence of
nongovernmental organizations. For an examination of the role of non-state actors in law-
making processes in the international arena, see Peter J. Spiro, New Players on the Interna-
tional Stage, 2 HOFSTRA L. & PoCv SYMP. 19. 24-36 (1998) and Peter J. Spiro, New Global
Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations and the "Unregulated -
 Marketplace, 18 CARDOZO L.
R•v. 957, 959-62 (1996).
2 In this Article, the terms "Internet" and "cyberspace" are used interchangeably.
3 Some scholars have expressed skepticism about the singularity of the Internet and its
effects on traditional regulatory forms, particularly in light of other revolutionary innova-
tions. For a general critique of the idea of a specific "law of cyberspace,' see generally
Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207. For an
international law perspective, discussing claims that the Internet is ungovernable by any
single nation-state, see generally jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanamhy, 65 U. Cm. L. Rev.
1199 (1998) (arguing that the Internet does not present any issues that international law
has not hitherto successfully confronted). See also Robert J. Gordon, Does the "New Economy -
Measure up to the Great Inventions of the Pastt, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2002, at 49, 66-72 (ex-
pressing skepticism about the economic impact of the Internet).
4 See Michael Spence, Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets, 92
Am. EC.ON, REV. 434, 454 (2002) (noting that the Internet has led to some productivity
gains due to shifts in market parameters, particularly in the area of transaction costs and
suggesting a need to study some of these shifts). Several empirical and theoretical studies
of the relationship between information technology and productivity exist. Sec, e.g., Erik
Brynjolfsson & Lorin M. Hitt. Beyond Computation: Information Technology, 0Pganizational
Transformation and Business Performance, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2000, at 23, 30-45; David
Lucking-Reiley & Daniel Spulber, Business-to-Business Electronic Commerce, J. ECON. PERSP„
Fall 2001. at 55, 56-62 (examining areas of expected increase in productivity gains in busi-
ness-to-business e-commerce); Stephen D. Oliner & Daniel E. Sichel, The Resurgence of
Growth in the Late 1990's: Is Information Technology the Story?, J. Et:cm PERSP., Fall 2000, at S.
9-21. Much of the current literature on the effect of the Internet and information tech-
nology on the market relies on Coase's seminal work on the nature of the firm. Sec Ronald
H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); cf. Gordon, supra note 3, at 54-
57 (arguing that the effect of information technology is not as significant for multifactor
productivity growth and may account for only twelve percent of economic activity).
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nomic literature had challenged assumptions fundamental to the
economic paradigm of free markets with limited government inter-
vention. Importantly, this body of economic analysis has contributed
to the study of the role of information in decision-making by firms
and individuals, identifying dislocations between competitive equilib-
rium models and market realities, while at the same time introducing
models that might better inform government policies or explain pol-
icy failures. 5
The role of information in a market for information is an impor-
tant factor in considering the appropriate function of intellectual
property rights in cyberspace, including the effect of such rights on
the development of e-commerce. 6 As societies seek to appropriate
maximum returns from the many markets 7 spawned by the Internet,
scholars and the public at large have intensely scrutinized the com-
parative effects and efficacy of public and private law regimes in regu-
lating behavior in cyberspace and in regulating cyberspace itself. 8 The
6 For discussions concerning the influence of information economics, see generally
DREW FUI)ENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY (1991); JACK HIRSIILEIFER & JOHN G.
RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION (1902); John G. Riley, Silver
Signals: Twenty-Five Pars of Savoring and Signaling, 39 J. Ecox. LITERATURE 432 (2001). In
my recent work, I have sought to introduce insights from information economics to ex-
plain and analyze particular concerns in international intellectual property regulation. See
generally Ruth L. Okediji, Rules of Power in an Age of Law: Process Opportunism and TRIPS Dis-
pute Settlement, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL.
ANALYSIS OF LAWS AND INsTrruTioNs (Kwan C. Choi & James Hartigan ed.. forthcoming
2004); Ruth L. Okediji, A Cartography of WTO TRIPS Dispute Settlement and the Future of Intel-
lectual Property Policy (March 15, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
Much of my knowledge and understanding has come from the work of several economists,
particularly that of Professor Joseph E. Stiglitz. Some articles with interesting implications
for intellectual property rights include the following: Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information, Screen-
ing and Welfare, in BAYESIAN MODELS IN ECONOMIC THEORY 209 (M. Boyer & R. KIIIIMFOID
eds., 1984); Barry J. Nalebuff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General
Theory of Compensation and Competition, 14 BELL J. ECON. 21 (1983); Joseph E. Stiglitz et al.,
Privatization, Information and Incentives, 6 J. OF POL'Y ANALYSIS AND MGMT. 567 (11187);
Joseph E. Slights, Information and Economic Analysis: A Perspective, 95 ECON. J. 21 (1985);
Joseph E. Slights. Incentives, Risk and Information: Notes Toward a Theory of Hierarchy, 6 !km
J. EcoN. 552 (1975). For a review essay of the contributions of information economics, see
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, 92 Am. EcoN. REv.
400 (2002) [hereinafter Stiglitz, Paradigm in Economics].
6 See Spence, supra note 4, at 453-54 (noting that the Internet has changed the infor-
mational structure of markets and identifying forces behind those changes).
7 I use the terminology "markets" to denote both formal transactions markets and
what I call "interaction" markets—that is chat rooms, bulletin boards, and other closed
areas where individuals engage primarily in social or political exchanges.
8 Sec. e.g. , Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights
Management," 97 Micti. L. Ri:v. 462, 480-515 (1998); I. Trotter Hardy, Properly (and Copy-
right) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 258-60; David R. Johnson & David Post, Law
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multiple regimes of cyberspace governance seek to bridge, or at the
least to coordinate, the divide between the substance of real-space so-
cial institutions and the vast, unlimited realms of cyberspace, with its
(mostly) private law and/or self-regulating norms. 9 Much of the "law"
of cyberspace thus is an experiment in social engineering between the
two spheres, examining the ways in which each sphere influences the
other, and the outcomes as they manifest in domestic and (less exam-
ined) global contexts)° Intellectual property regulation assumes a
central role in this engineering project.
The familiar orthodoxy of intellectual property rights
justification is rooted in the classic assumption that property rights are
indispensable to a well-functioning market. 11
 The theory assumes that
proprietary rights granted by statutes are necessary tools to induce
creative production to promote the public good through the progress
of the national economy materially, socially, and culturally. 12 However,
the dynamic efficiency and social welfare goals implicit in the ena-
bling constitutional clause for intellectual property protection" re-
quire certain margins of permissible activity by users and subsequent.
and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1400-02 (1996); Law-
rence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403. 1403-11 (1996); Maureen A.
O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 MINN. L. REV. 609, 640-
86 (1998).
9 SeeJohnson & Post, supra note 8, at 1390-91.
I° See id. at 1393-400; cf. Lessig, supra note 8, at 1403 (criticizing the idea that cyber-
space is distinct from real space).
11 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 36-45 (5th ed. 1998); Ronald
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost. 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 19-28 (1960); Harold Demsetz, Toward
a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Ain. ECON. REV. 347, 347-59 (1967).
12
 There is an extensive body of literature dealing with the different justifications for
intellectual property. In the area of copyright particularly; several scholars have explored
cultural, social, and economic justifications for such protection. See generally, 1Vendy J.
Gordon. A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE Lj. 1533 (1993); Hardy, supra note 8; Jessica Littnan, The Pub-
lic Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic
Civil Society. 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996).
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cI. 8; see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The
economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copy-
rights is the conviction that the encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the
best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science
and useful Arts.'"); H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1909) ("The enactment of
copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not based on any
natural right that the author has in his writing ... but upon the ground that the welfare of
the public will be served and the progress of science and the useful arts will be promoted
by securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings.").
20031	 Information Markets and the Construction of Proprietary Rights	 549
innovators." It is the regulation of these activities that is most intrac-
table in contemporary debates about the extension of intellectual
property rights to the digital domain. 15 The regulation of intellectual
property rights is not a zero-sum game: "one-time" consumption
where minimal or no additional value—private or social—is gener-
ated by using the product is inconsistent with the ideal of intellectual
property protection. 16 Additionally, if the construction of rights raises
transaction costs beyond the level already internalized by the initial
grant.," then there are important implications both for whether mar-
kets for, or involving protected intellectual property will clear given
14 See Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CAnnozo L. REV. 121. 121-27 (1999)
(arguing that indeterminate entitlements call promote efficient transactions in cyber-
space).
16 See, e.g.. Tom W. Bell, Fair Use v. Fared Use: The Impact of Alt 'mowed Rights Management
on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 71i N.C. L. REV. 557(1998); Hardy, supra note 8; I. Trotter
Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace; 55 U. Prm L. Mx. 993 (1994); Pamela Sa-
muelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations
Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999). Even in the off-line world the rela-
tionship between first and second comers is fraught with considerable tension and uncer-
tainty as to the nature of the entitlements that legal rules reserve to either party. See Burk,
supra note 14, at 121-27 (suggesting that the on-line world would benefit from the range
of entitlements—from complete and strong to divided and weak—that currently exist in
real property).
16 SeeBurk, supra note 14, at 143-44; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incen-
tives-Access Paradigm, 49 Vann), L Rt:v. 483 (1996); Netanel, supra note 12. In the vintage
utilitarian justification, the grant of proprietary rights is designed to "promote" progress.
An instrumentalist view of "progress" would include both access to and use of protected
works. See Lunney, supra; Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use
Doctrine for Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV. 107, 117 (2001). The objectives of the TRIPs Agree-
ment reflect similar public policy ideals. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-
Mnitilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uraguay Round): Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15,
1993, 33 I.L.M. 81, 84 ("taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate
protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to
enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade
A venerable body of literature has examined the language and intent of the intellec-
tual property clause. What seems relatively uncontroversial is that intellectual property
rights exist to benefit society in a number of different ways. See supra note 12 and accom-
panying text.
17 Most students of intellectual property are familiar with the classic trade-offs in the
intellectual property bargain: exclusive rights are granted in exchange for disclosure. The
economic and administrative costs of the system are a trade-off to ensure optimal levels of
creativity and innovation. The costs of granting intellectual property rights are assumed to
be less than the value generated by the availability of the grant for qualifying works. Intel-
lectual property rights are thus consistent with some theories of property, namely that the
allocation of rights internalizes certain externalities and affects decisions made by persons
in an interactive setting. SceDemsetz, supra note II, at 348.
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the new externalities. 18
 There is also the familiar problem of how
overall welfare is affected by a corresponding decrease in the scope of
freely permitted activities. 19
The debate about the regulation of proprietary interests in cyber-
space focuses almost exclusively on how to preserve the "delicate bal-
ance" between public welfare and private interests in the digital
arena . 20
 Particularly in the digital environment, every consumer/user
18
 The argument advanced on behalf of owners in the digital context is that stronger
rights, measured both by numbers and scope. are necessary to internalize the harmful
effects of digital technology. See Hardy, supra note 8, at 223-28 (discussing four factors that
limit copying, including state-of-the-art limitations). Professor Hardy argues that because
cyberspace exponentially shrinks the assurances from copying based on the state of exist-
ing technology, there should understandably be a corresponding increase in other forms
of protection to preserve the aggregate level of assurance to which owners are "entitled."
Sec id. But see Cohen, supra note 8, at 547-49. Of course, there is always the argument that
technology itself can resolve the problem of transaction costs in intellectual property bar-
gains. In part, the rights management regime intensely debated, but nevertheless estab-
lished by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), reflects this notion. Sec 17
U.S.C. § 1201 (1998). Two appellate decisions regarding the fair use doctrine also reflect
elements of this argument. See. e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco. Inc., 60 F.3d 913,
930-31 (2t1 Cir. 1994) (stating that "it is not unsound to conclude that the right to seek
payment for a particular use tends to become legally cognizable under the fourth fair use
factor when the means for paying for such a use is made easier"). The court concluded
that the development of a market for users to obtain licenses makes it appropriate now to
consider the loss of licensing revenue in analysis of the fourth fair use factor which focuses
inquiry on the effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value of. the protected
work. See id. at 931-32; sec also Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Sem, Inc., 99 F.3d
1381,1386-87 (6th Cu-, 1996). There is a wealth of literature on the issue of market failure
(failure of markets to clear) and the fair use doctrine. The leading article on the topic is
WendyJ. Gordon's Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax
Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM, L. REV. 1600 (1982). Sec also Bell, supra note 15, at 596-
600; Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Iliadic: Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copy-
right Permiision Systems, 51 IN'EELL. PROP. 1,32-47 (1997); Robert P. Merges. The End of
Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BER-
KELEY TECH. L.J. 1 15, 130-36 (1997).
19 Sec generally Lunney, supra note 16. For discussions on the scope of rights between
first and second innovators/creators, see references cited infra, note 21. In copyright law,
secondary creators may violate both the right to copy and the right to make a derivative
work from the protected work, On the scope of derivative rights, see generally Paul Gold-
stein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 301 Corvalcarr Soc'v 209 (1983).
2‘' See generally Thomas Dreier, Balancing Proprietary and Public Domain Interests: Inside or
Outside of Proprietary Rights, in EXPANDING 111E BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 295 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds..
2001) (hereinafter INNOVATION POLICY) (discussing the debate over what the balance
should be and what regulatory tools may be used to fashion such a balance). Professor
Dreier concludes that the intellectual property framework is still the most desireable. See
id.; see also Bell, supra note 15, at 596-600; Loren, supra note 18, at 32-47; Merges, supra
note 18, at 130-36; Okediji, supra note 16, at 112,153-73 (suggesting that the evolutionary
nature of information technology requires a dynamic view of the fair use doctrine, and
that efforts should focus on rethinking the nature of the balance to reflect the benefits of
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is a potential creator/innovator, thus requiring a dynamic regulatory
balance between the rights and interests of owners and users. 21 Policy
maker's have not countered legislation and judicial decisions
strengthening the proprietary interests of owners with corresponding
limitations or exceptions. Indeed, as many have argued, policy makers
have not sufficiently preserved even existing limitations under the
new intellectual property regime designed ostensibly to offset the ad-
vantages gained by consumers with digital technology. 22 In arguing for
stronger protection, proprietors imply that the digital environment
unleashes a "natural" brutish tendency in consumers to violate pro-
prietary rights—a tendency that must be met and prevented with vig-
orous anti-copying mechanisms—both legal and technological.
Commentators, however, have focused less on how the information
structure of information markets should affect intellectual property
regulation, and what this implies for how well, if at all, intellectual
cyberspace interactions rather than attempting to apply the balance crafted for print works
to the digital environment).
21 This principle is at least partially evident in the exceptions and limitations available
in patent and copyright law. Principally, however, the legal structure of intellectual prop-
erty rights between first and second innovators/creators is fashioned by courts incremen-
tally (and not always consistently) as they construe the scope of the statutory rights and
limitations. One problematic result is that follow-on innovators/creators have no certain
or predictable rights and the legitimacy or propriety of private decisions to improve on,
work with, or in other ways utilize protected material is always made with a degree of risk.
See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coosa and Intellectual Property, 94 Column. L. REV.
2655, 2658-59 (1994) (discussing difficulties in applying the Coase Theorem to intellec-
tual property transactions because of the difficulty in identifying whether externalities
exist and what they are in the context of first and second creators). For a discussion of the
scope of intellectual property rights and second comers, see generally Ednumd W. Kitch,
The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcoN. 265 (1977); Mark A. Lemley,
The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 989 (1997); Robert
P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope. 90 Comm. L. Rev.
839 (1990); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and
the Patent Law, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 29. In copyright law, the fair use doctrine
has provided a rich context for the discussion of copyright scope with regard to unauthor-
ized creative uses of protected work. See Lemley, supra, at 1036-38: Okediji, supra note 16,
at 126-29; see generally Dreier, supra note 20. Professor Joe Liti's contribution to this sympo-
sium is also an important consideration of the topic of copyright scope. The idea of a crea-
tive or interactive user illustrates the slippery slope between user/infringer and creator. See
Joseph Litt, Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer43 B.C. L. REV. 397 (2003).
22 Sec Samuelson, supra note 15, at 562-66; see also Cohen, supra note 8, at 559-63;
David Nimmer, Appreciating Legislative History: The Sweet and Sour Spots of the DMCA's Com-
mentary, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 967 (2002) (noting that Congress weighed two policy
judgements regarding fair use and chose the option that would preserve fair use in the
digital world).
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property rights can be translated into cyberspace. 23 In particular, the
way in which copyrights, and more recently patents, 24 function in the
digital environment to a large extent establishes some a priori norms
about governance in cyberspace. As legal realists argued, property
rights designate a form of sovereignty.° Consequently; the strength of
those rights assumes qualities of governance that limit formal gov-
ernments to the fringes of Internet regulation° in a manner consis-
tent with laissez-faire economic models of market efficiency. 27 Given
that the initial grant of intellectual property protection is intended to
resolve the public goods problem, market creation is at least one
function of intellectual property rights that applies with equal or
greater force to the Internet.
My broad interest in this Article is the contest between govern-
ment regulation and free markets. The very notion of a "market" in
cyberspace preconditions us to anticipate certain returns based on the
classic assumption of minimal or no government intervention. In a
framework of competing markets and competition for markets, how-
ever, government is recast as the arbiter between an aggregate of
forces that influence the behavior of firms and individuals, and the
technological control over some of those forces that is inherent in the
allocation of intellectual property rights. 28 With the harmonization of
intellectual property rights pursuant to the Agreement on Trade Re-
23 I deliberately use the word "translate" to distinguish my specific focus in this Article
from the more familiar problem of how extant intellectual property doctrines and pre-
cepts can remain unchanged in cyberspace. This ongoing project is one of preservation. In
this Article, however, my interest is narrowly confined to considering the possibilities of a
change in the function or form of proprietary rights.
Specifically, the grant of business method patents. See State Street Bank & Trust Co.
v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368,1375-77 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
25
	 e.g.. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty. 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8, 8-12 (1927).
28 Governments, however, have been increasingly aggressive in asserting jurisdictional
control in a number of disputes involving cyberactivity. See Michael Geist, Cyberlaw 2.0: New
Laws and New Borders, 43 B.C. L. REV, 323. 332-57 (2003). In a recent case where an Austra-
lian High Court asserted jurisdiction over Dowiones, the court expressed disapproval over
a jurisdictional rule that would "entrench" the United States as the forum for disputes over
on-line activity. See Dow Jones & Co. v. Gumick (2002) 194 A.L.R. 433 (Supreme Court of
Victoria, on appeal to the Australian High Court).
27 Professor Geist notes that there is increasing government regulation of cyberspace
and cites examples in the e-commerce realm. Sec Geist, supra note 26, at 332-47. None of
these examples, however, affect market conditions or market structure. It is in this sense
that I argue that government interference is important.
28 Sec Susan DeSanti et al., Competition to Innovate: Strategies for Proper Antitrust Assess-
ments, in INNOVATION POLICY, supra note 20, at 317-18 (noting the tension between pro-
moting productivity which requires innovation and promoting competition in innovation).
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lated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs Agreement"), 29
and the likelihood that the World Intellectual Properly Organization
("WIPO") Internet Treaties" may serve to harden even the "soft"
norms of TRIPs into legal rtiles,si most governments can choose this
dormant role as the optimal strategy without explicitly addressing dis-
tributional effects or other welfare concerns. As global trade rules"
bring countries closer by lowering or erasing barriers to market entry,
the classic assumption that markets operate most efficiently if gov-
ernments refrain from regulating them is already a powerful force in
molding the shape of competition for markets in cyberspace. if free
market. policies significantly influence the construction of proprietary
interests in cyberspace, it is important to explore how the Internet has
affected the traditional functioning of markets. To do so, we must
consider the informational properties of intellectual property rights
and how these properties affect the behavior of firms and individu-
als."
29 Agreement Establishing the NVorld Trade Organization, Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994; 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter
TRIPs Agreement].
WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 1.L.M. 65 [hereinafter WCF]; WIPO Per-
formances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 [hereinafter WPPT].
31 Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Standard, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
75, 152-53 (2000) (concluding that the Agreed Statements to the WC'I' could be used to
establish evidence of subsequent state practice and thus serve as a source of customary
international law between members of the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement);
see also Neil W. Netanel, The Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO Copyright Treaty on TRIPS
Dispute Settlement, 37 VA. J. INT'L I.. 441, 449-51 (1997) (discussing how the WIPO Copy-
right Treaty could be interpreted in light of the TRIPS Agreement).
32 A preliminary word on globalization: it is common to describe the Internet as a
global communications medium. The global nature of the Internet, however, is, thus far,
limited to the technological promise that links the international community through in-
formation networks. In reality, the characteristics of the Internet—its users, its culture, the
dominant language and even the legal norms most referenced—are distinctly those of the
western hemisphere. See Neil 1Veinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View
from Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CALIF, L. REV. 395, 445 (2000). If the domestic law of cy-
berspace is yet unformed, the international law of cyberspace is yet to be imagined. In the
process of social engineering, cyberlaw insistontend not only with competing visions of
optimal governance structures, best described as a problem of "multiple and overlapping
sovereignties," but with whom is being governed and what is the end of such governance.
Keith Aoki, Considering Multiple and Overlapping Sovereignties: Liberalism, Libertarianism, Na-
tional Sovereignty, "Global" Intellectual Property, and the Internet, 5 INn. J. Gi,onAt, LLGAL STun.
443, 443-46 (1998).
"Recent articles have examined the role of information in the patent system and how
patents themselves serve certain informational roles. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks
to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 770-84 (2002); Clarisa Long,
Patent Signals, 69 U. Ctn. L. REV. 625, 643-78 (2002).
554	 Boston College Law Review
	
[Vol. 44:545
Two significant benefits of the Internet for markets are: (1) vast
reductions in transaction costs; 34 and (2) shifting boundaries of. the
firm that require new organizational strategies to enhance productiv-
ity." Expansive intellectual property rights in cyberspace can adversely
affect the ability of firms to capture these benefits." For cyberspace
transactions, intellectual property regulation is only one piece of a
chain of strategies designed to take advantage of the opportunities to
use the Internet to overcome limitations present in traditional mar-
kets." Intellectual property regulation thus peculiarly affects the link
between innovation and productivity in the information economy
Part I of this Article considers market solutions achieved by the
competitive ethos as an important characteristic of cyberspace for
policymakers. 38 Indeed, it is within this competitive framework that
governance practices are likely to "harden" as multinational actors,
both corporate and individual, share, modify, and ratify commercial
customs." Despite the strong influence of free market arguments in
areas ranging from privacy concerns to First Amendment rights, the
corresponding expansive construction of intellectual property rights
only affirms a narrow vision of competition in cyberspace. As I argue,
expansive rights will favor existing forms of business organization
rather than encourage investment in strategies that exploit the bene-
fits of the network beyond the pervasive pricing or advertising models
that have characterized most firms' entry into cyberspace. Many of
34 See Hardy, supra note 8, at 236-37.
33
 Scholars have identified four areas that are related to the drastic reduction in trans-
action costs: (1) efficiencies from the automation of transactions: (2) intermediation and
market-making by brokers, auctioneers, dealers, and exchanges; (3) consolidation of de-
mand and supply through organized exchanges between firms in the same industry; and
(4) changes in the organization of firms reflected in economic processes that take place
within the firm and those that are outsonrced. Sec Brynjolfsson & Hitt, supra note 4, at 30-
45; Lucking-Reiley & Spulber, supra note 4, at 56-62; Oliner & Sichel, supra note 4, at 9-
21; sec also Spence. supra note 4, at 454-55 (identifying similar areas).
36 For example, business method patents threaten the ability of businesses to capture
such benefits. Compare Ann Marie Rizzo, The Aftermath of Stale Street Bank & Trust v. Signa-
ture Financial Group: Effects of United States Electronic Commerce Business Method Patentability
on International Legal and Economic Systems, 50 DEPAUL L. Itt:v. 313, 361-62 (2000), with
Jeffrey R. Koester & Lawrence E. Thompson, Risks Associated with Restricting Business Method
and E-Commeree Patents, 17 GA. ST. U. L. Rix. 657 (2001).
37 See generally Spence, sups note 4.
33 See infra notes 43-68 and accompanying text.
39 For discussion of the development and application of trade usage to supplement
(and in many cases legitimize) shrinkwrap agreements, see generally David McGowan,
Recognizing Usages of Trade: A Case Study from Electronic Commerce, 8 WASII. U. J.L. & Pot; Y
167 (2002).
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these schemes entail large one-time sunk entry costs. 40 Part 11 dis-
cusses several characteristics of information markets and how proprie-
tary rights influence the utility of traditional market factors such as
price, transaction costs, bargaining, and equilibria.'" Finally, Part III
identifies some governance implications of the new challenges that. a
market for information poses, and what lessons can be gleaned about
the future of proprietary rights in cyberspace, particularly for compe-
tition and, ultimately, for e-commerce. 42 The discussion here is by no
means exhaustive; indeed each of the issues merits significant analysis.
However, by raising them in a preliminary fashion, this Article will
demonstrate the risks and stakes of expansive construction of proprie-
tary rights in a broader macroeconomic policy context.
I. LEX MERCATORIA AND THE INVISIBLE HAND
For both conunercial and personal activity, 43 the construction of
intellectual property rights largely determines the bounds of legiti-
mate activity in cyberspace. In the classic regulatory model, the initial
grant of rights rewards innovation and encourages further investment
in the production of goods and services." It therefore is important to
Sec infra notes 43-68 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 69-109 and accompanying text,
42 See infra notes 110-126 and accompanying text.
45 Distinctions of this sort are increasingly difficult to sustain in the digital context
where users, consumers, and producers are often one and the same. Sec supra note 21 and
accompanying text. For my immediate purposes, the distinction is intended to identify
initial interest in using a particular product.
44 See POSNER, supra note 11, at 54. This paradigmatic rationalization of intellectual
property rights is somewhat reductionist. Empirical data does not support a direct rela-
tionship between property rights and investment incentives. However, "secure" property
rights (i.e., enforceable rights) are not tantamount to expansive rights. In other words,
having a guarantee of complete, indivisible property- interests does not necessarily increase
the amount of investment an individual is willing to make. For example, an individual that
has decided to purchase land will likely do so despite the other property rules that permit
or facilitate some encroachment on that property. Indeed, a robust body of literature has
analyzed the value of less than determinate property rights. See generally, e.g.. Burk, supra
note 14; Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14
J. LEGAL Srun. 13 (1985); Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of thgueness in Takings Doctrine, 24
CAknozo L. REV. 93 (2002); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 577 (1988). Once the decision to invest is made, it necessarily has partially internal-
ized the costs of divided entitlements that permit some encroachment. Trotter Hardy
makes this point about information owners. Sec Hardy, supra note 8, at 222 (noting that
`would-be producers of information need some assurance that copying will be limited. The
notion of 'some assurance' rather than 'complete assurance' reflects the fact that 100 per-
cent assurance of anything—or zero risk—has never been a requirement of any business.
Similarly, I use the deliberately vague notion of 'limited' copying rather than 'no copying'
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preserve incentives to innovate in order to secure continued produc-
tivity, and to enhance competitiveness. Even with regard to trademark
protection, which is not premised on the reward/incentive model,
investment in a distinguishing mark plays an important role in market
structure by reducing information search costs and transaction costs. 45
Among other informational values, 46 a grant of copyright or pat-
ent protection ideally informs users/consumers about the scope of
permissible uses of the protected good, including what is not pro-
tected and thus freely available for use.47 In copyright, for example,
where search costs (such as costs incurred locating owners or obtain-
ing permission) can be high, and success at times impossible, several
scholars have argued that the rise of institutional agencies and rights
management systems may alleviate such costs.48 The complex rules
governing the scope of protection, however, make it very difficult for
because the exact amount of copying that an information producer will tolerate will vary
widely In the copyright context, extending protection to derivative works, for ex-
ample, is likely less relevant to the decision to produce informational works that the right
to exclude copying. This causal observation is certainly affirmed in the context of patent
law where the possibility of an improvement by a secondary innovator does not deter the
first inventor. The point is that the grant of proprietary rights in a creative work may. and
does, lead to additional creativity by a variety of individuals other than the
author/inventor. As others have argued, this outcome is a public benefit that can enhance
social welfare. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 21; Liu, supra note 21; Lunney, supra note 16.
45 See Phillip Nelson, Advertising as ',Variation, 82 J. Pot.. EcoN. 729, 730-31 (1974);
George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information. 69 J. Pot- EcoN. 213, 215-16 (1961).
48 See Long, supra note 33, at 644-55 (exploring the informational role of patents in
capital markets and concluding that signaled characteristics of a firm with a large patent
portfolio are positive).
47 Cohen, supra note 8, at 548-49 ("[I]f the public is willing to pay the prices set by
copyright owners, we must ask what the public believes it is paying for, and what copyright
owners believe they are selling. Any answer to that question must take existing statutorily-
mandated public access and use rights into account.... [The public] ... count[s] among
those benefits those that the public law of copyright guarantees"), Some have criticized
this point by noting that the "public" generally has no idea which uses are permissible;
such a recognition. however, seems to strengthen the argument for clarifying intellectual
property rights in cyberspace.
48 See, e.g, Bell. supra note 15, at 583-84; Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability
Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations. 84 CAL L. Rev. 1293,
1377 (1996); see also supra note 17 and accompanying text. Note, however, that this as-
sumption addresses the primarily economic costs involved with search, not intangible costs
associated with the inability of a user to pay for the use and any resulting social loss, In the
digital context, an additional cost that should factor into the equation is the cost of added
attempts to "hack" or otherwise overcome barriers to access to digital works, including the
development of tools that make it possible to do so. Although the DMCA has outlawed
such attempts and devices, the DMCA model is not yet universal. Further, the administra-
tive, legal, and economic costs of adding yet another layer to the already cumbersome
copyright laws must still be considered in evaluating the efficiency of the system as a whole.
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uninformed actors to obtain information about which acts are legiti-
mate without permission of the owner. 49 Indeed, the most robust limi-
tations and exceptions to exclusivity involve balancing tests that are
not susceptible to bright line rules, thus making it difficult to measure
the costs occasioned by "fuzzy" signals sent by the grant of a proprie-
tary interest. 5°
Consider, for example, the fair use doctrine or the
idea/expression dichotomy, which have been the subject of intense
scholarly debate and judicial scrutiny. 51 The typical user of a copy-
righted work is unlikely to have a definite sense of when a particular
use qualifies as a "fair use," or how to distinguish an unprotectable
"idea" from protectable "expression." The affirmative rights of the
public under the copyright scheme effectively do not exist when the
exercise of those rights requires users to incur such significant infor-
mation costs. 52 Consequently, although proprietary rights may moti-
vate capital markets in positive ways and reduce information asymme-
tries between investors and firms, there may in fact be a
corresponding increase in information asymmetry between consumers
and owners." The fact is, most owners tend to overstate the scope of
45 Merges, supra note 21, at 2658.
5° Id. (noting that with intellectual property rights, there is likely to be great debate
over whether externalities exist at all because, in the patent realm, an infringer may not
know ex ante that her independently created work is an infringement); see also Burk, supra
note 14, at 138 (arguing that muddy rules may enhance levels of creativity by encouraging
bargaining between copyright owners and would be users).
51 See. e.g., Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion ofFair ,Use Guidelines, 62
Onto ST, LJ, 599 (2001); Glynn S. UM neydr., Fair Use and Mather Failure: Sony Revisited, 82
1LU. L. Rev. 975 (2002); Honorable Jon 0. Newman, New Lyrics for an Old Melody: The
Idea/Expression Dichotomy in the Computer Age, 17 CARDOZ0 AWIN & ENT. Lj. 691 (1999).
52 Law and economics literature identifies two forms in which law may be created—
rules or standards. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Tams Standards: An Economic Analysis,
42 Dula L. J. 557, 557 (1992). A rule is given content ex ante, specifying what precise
conduct is prohibited or allowed. On the other hand, a standard is flexible and generally is
given content ex post. Although rules are more costly to promulgate, individuals are better
able to make informed decisions about the benefits of compliance. See id. A standard.
however, is cheaper to promulgate, but raises the cost of acquiring information.
Consequently, individuals will decide either to acquire information about the standard to
make an informed decision, will fail to act, or will act only on the strongest interpretation
of the standard to avoid any accusations of violation. The latter is a problem associated
with levels of risk aversion. See id.
55 1 might add that intellectual property grants may also introduce asymmetries of in-
formation between investors and firms. Consider, for example, the fact that fifteen million
dollars of venture capital was invested into Napster, which was ultimately ruled to be a
violation of the laws protecting the proprietary interests of the content industry. P.J.
Huffstutler, company Town EMusic, Grammy Producer Joins Legal Assault on Napster, L.A.
Tnuts, Mar. 8, 2001. at CO.
558	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 44:545
their rights, and most users do not have sufficient knowledge of the
increasingly complex rules of copyright law, 54 Users must therefore
acquire the necessary information to determine whether and how to
use the protected work. Information acquisition, however, may not
sufficiently resolve this asymmetry because even an attorney's best
guess as to whether a particular use is "fair," or what distinguishes idea
from expression, cannot predict with certainty how a specific case will
be determined in court. It is possible that this depiction exaggerates
die case: indeterminacy may simply be a problem at the margins and
the case law reveals some aggregation of factors that guide a court in
making determinations so that outcomes are largely predictable. Al-
though this may be true in a world of print materials, 55 the bounda-
ries have certainly shifted in the digital context, and the scope of limi-
tations on protected works is not at all clear. 5° Institutional solutions
may be just as over-inclusive as technological systems to prevent unau-
thorized access to the work; a license for a use that may be guaranteed
to the public by the copyright scheme arguably is still an added cost in
social welfare terms. 57
It is necessary to mention a point concerning the acquisition of
information by users to facilitate use of the protected work. A user's
decision to acquire information is efficient and socially desirable
when the accuracy of the information is certain and the social benefit
of the information exceeds the cost of acquisition. In other words, will
the benefits that flow from a consumer's change in behavior due to
the acquired information maximize welfare? In the intellectual prop-
erty context, this question specifically refers to the benefits of compli-
ance with the scope of the right as decided by the owner when corn-
pared with the social value/benefit of the intended use. When the
information is inaccurate and the consumer alters her behavior to con-
form to the information acquired, the possible welfare loss is doubled.
54 SeeJessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19,
38-39 (1996); see also Cohen, supra note 8, at 547-49.
55 But see Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381,1412 (6th Cir.
1906); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913,940-41 (2d Cir. 1994).
56 Consider, for example, that "ordinary uses" of the Internet does many infringers
make. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Toward a "New Deal" for Copyright in the Information
Age, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1488 (2002). For example, routine practices such as downloading
material, forwarding email, etc., are, strict,: sour:, copyright infringement. For an institu-
tional solution to this problem, see Mark A. Lemley, Dealing With Overlapping Copyrights on
the Internet, 22 U. DAVWN L. REV. 547,584-85 (1997), proposing a license system for mul-
tiple use of works on the Internet.
57 Sec Cohen, supra note 8, at 542-43.
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Such loss consists of the cost of acquisition (search costs) and the cost
of the use.
The situation may not be as bleak with respect to patents, in part.
because patents are subject to fewer exceptions and limitations, and
because patent information tends to be much more significant be-
tween firms, rather than between firms and individuals. In most cases
then, the incentive/reward model may supply sufficient motives for a
firm wishing to invent around the patent to invest in costly informa-
tion acquisition to determine the scope of legitimate innovative activ-
ity. Again, however, if the information is inaccurate (such as when the
patent arguably is invalid), some welfare loss exists. This is because, in
addition to the loss associated with the existence of wrong informa-
don, the would-be user incurred acquisition costs to innovate strategi-
cally around the invention. In light of increasing calls for patent re-
form,58 reliance on the informational properties of the patent grant is
also suspect. 59 Other policy interests, such as encouraging competi-
tion, may necessitate governmental interference with the way in which
owners exercise patent rights in the market. 89 Such actions may allevi-
ate some of the welfare loss by limiting the power of the patent owner.
The way informational characteristics of intellectual property
rights affect market structure and behavior requires consideration of
the conditions under which such regimes make the initial allocation
of a property right. Because the initial grant affects investment, pro-
prietors conventionally argue for strong property rights.m Indeed, the
traditional debate is generally cast as one of property rules versus li-
66 Mark A. Lemiey, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office. 95 NW. U.L. REV. 1495, 1495
(2001); Arti Rai. Addressing the Patent Gold Rush: The Role of Deference to PTO Patent Denials, 2
WAsn. U. J.1.. & PoL'Y 199, 203 (2000).
69 See Nancy T. Gallini, The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform, J.
ECON. PERSP., Spring 2002, at 131. 149-50.
60 See DeSanti at al., supra note 28, at 317-18; see also Halms Ullrich, Intellectual Property,
Access to Information, and Antitrust: Harmony. Disharmony and International Harmonization, in
INNOVATION POLICY, supra note 20, at 365.
61 See generally Simon Johnson at al.. Property Rights and Finance. 92 Am, ECoN, REV. 1335
(2002) (concluding that hi five post-communist countries, the security of property rights
alone sufficiently and positively affects firms' decisions to reinvest retained earnings). The
authors also find is weak correlation between external credit availability and the decision to
invest. Sec id. Countries in transition provide a useful analogy to cyberspace given the fact
that these economies are characterized by disequilibrium, weak or nonexistent regulatory
institutions, significant preoccupation with the development of legal norms, and a need
for reform or adaptation of existing macroeconomic tools,
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ability rules. 62
 A distinction should be drawn, however, between well-
defined property rights (perhaps through the use of rules rather than
standards) and strong property rights. The latter facilitate market
transactions and should be sufficient to encourage optimal levels of
investment. 63
 It is difficult to define precisely how strong those rights
should be, but there is a consensus that overly strong rights (either
explicitly or through judicial construction) deter innovation. 64
 Invest,
ing more resources in maintaining the signal (meaning the proprie-
tary right) in the cyberspace context, and further expanding the
property interest without any evidence of greater transactional
efficiencies or productivity, is simply socially wasteful and regressive.° 5
Perhaps then, defining the appropriate scope of rights for owners
is not as pivotal as fashioning an appropriate remedy for users to de-
ter overreaching by owners. Using remedies to encourage further
creativity by users and to stimulate competition in the market, may
better advance the goals of competition and innovation. In the first
place, a system of remedies for infringement and for overreaching
may create incentives for greater compliance on both sides of the
transaction. Compliance in this sense would include cooperative bar-
gaining by the parties to negotiate use of the protected work on mu-
tually agreeable terms. Although this will not address the asymmetry
problem, it gives creative users a bargaining tool 86
 Thus, the overall
social cost of the asymmetry may be reduced by bargaining that allows
productive use on efficient terms.
Another possibility is to change the source of information from
the owner, and to rethink ways of specifying rules 67 rather than open-
ended standards. This will facilitate effective screening by potential
62 See J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 Co-
LOW L. Rev. 2432, 2436-42 (1994); sec also. Merges, supra note 21, at 2655-62 (comment-
ing on Professor Reichman's article).
63
 Sedan Eeckhout & Boyan Jovanovic, Knowledge Spillovers and Inequality, 92 Am. ECON.
REV. 1290, 1290-91 (2002) (challenging literature posting that spillovers from leading
firms allow other firms to catch up and thus reduce inequalities between firms).
" In the patent area, a number of scholars have raised this concern. See, Gallini,
supra note 59, at 131-33 (citing other articles); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698-
701 (1998).
e° Sec POSNER. supra note 11, at 53.
66
 Some commentators have suggested that the fair use doctrine could serve the same
purpose. See Burk, supra note 14, at 140-41; Gordon, supra note 18, at 1614-15 (suggesting
fair use when there is evidence of a market failure); Lumley. supra note 51, at 981.
67 See Litman, supra note 54, at 19.
66
 Screening is a term used to denote attempts by an uninformed player to distinguish
the well-informed player from the poorly informed player in games of incomplete jam--
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users and competitive uses of proprietary works in new ways to create
new markets. In essence, it requires that the government become
more involved in providing information either through simpler,
clearer rules, or by directing the appropriate government agencies to
provide counsel about requested uses of protected work, with such
advice carrying some legal significance in the event of adjudication.
IL SOME ALTERNATIVE PARADIGMS FOR THE MARKET:
THE NEED FOR A VISIBLE HAND
The most noted changes to the informational structure of mar-
kets in cyberspace are those associated with reduced transaction costs.
Reduced transaction costs are most evident in the overwhelming ease
with which buyers and sellers can find each other, acquire informa-
tion about each other, and compare prices and products in cyber-
space.° The ability to create markets taking advantage of these char-
acteristics can also introduce some monopoly features, as is evidenced
by eBay, the largest marketplace on the Internet:70 Indeed, commen-
tators have noted that, when dealing with the competing media gi-
ants, like AOL Time Warner, eBay chose the path of least resistance—
rather than compete with AOL, eBay decided to work alongside it."
Price aggregation and comparison software would eliminate monop-
oly gains of such large markets and enhance competition by eliminat-
ing advantages of large entities like eBay where markets are mach
more liquid. 72 Ironically, it was precisely the use of intelligent software
Illation. When screening is .successfu l, separating equilibria obtains. See generally Stiglitz.
Paradigm in Economics, supia note 5. at 475-76.
Sec Severin Borenstein & Garth Saloner, Economics and Electronic Commerce, J. ECON.
PERSP., Winter 2001, at 3, 4-9 (discussing a number of ways the Internet creates value both
on the supply and demand side); Spence, supra note 4. at 453-55.
" EBay has succeeded with a mbi of competition and compromise. On one hand, eBay
has consistently fought off efforts by competitors to break eBay's near monopoly of the on-
line auction industry. See Cecilia Kang. On-line Auction Group Prepares to Attack eBay; but Loyal
Following May Help Menial Leader Withstand the Assault. Oil. Thni., Sept. 27, 1999, at C2. But
see Reid J. Epstein, Who Needs eBay?, WALL, ST. J., Sept. 11, 2002 at Al (describing "Tradio"
an on-air swap meet that dominates small town radio stations and facilitates auction trades
that, unlike the eBay format, are ultimately negotiated face to face).
71 Sec Press Release. eBay, America Online and eBay Expand Relationship: Multi-Year
Agreement Enhances eBay's the Preferred Person-to-Person Online Auction Service on
AOL (Sept. 2. 1998), available at http://pages.ebay.com/communit/aboutebay/releases
/pr98. html#19 (last visited Jan. 31, 2003); see also Mary Kwak & David Yoffie, Inside Track—
Lessons from the Dotcom Days, FIN. Timis (London), Sept. 28, 2001, at 12 (noting that eBay
entered into business agreements with AOL to "[reduce] AOL's desire and ability to
launch a crippling attack").
72 Spence, supra note 4, at 454-55 n.29.
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for this purpose that the court struck down, using a property theory
of trespass to chattel, in eBay v. Bidder's Edge." Such intelligent soft-
ware also reduces the search cost for finding the lowest price to a
point close to zero.
The same economic model of intellectual property rights in real-
space pervades analysis of these rights in cyberspace: there is a pre-
sumed competitive equilibrium so that the allocation of property
rights facilitates efficient markets. 74 Economists, however, have dem-
onstrated that equilibrium may be nonexistent in a competitive mar-
ket with imperfect information. 75 For example, in Bidder's Edge, the
court did not seem to give much thought to the fact that its decision
at best reintroduced protection from price competition for eBay or, at
worst, transferred the cost of finding the lowest price for goods back
to users. The reduction or elimination of search costs improves compe-
tition in cyberspace; 76 Bidder's Edge's attempt to gather this informa-
tion with limited cost would have made the market more liquid."
Price protection introduces information asymmetries that obscure
what the parameters ought to be to determine whether the market is
functioning well.
Imperfect information is also inherent in the construction of the
permissible scope of activity with regard to exceptions to intellectual
property rights. A competitive market assumes that each market par-
ticipant believes that she has no effect on the activities of others. In a
limitless market like cyberspace, this optimal state of competitiveness
might even he considered "natural" in the classic sense, so that gov-
ernment intervention is hardly necessary. But, in fact, more govern-
ment intervention may be necessary in cyberspace because the pres-
73 See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Stipp. 2d 1058, 1069-70 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(protecting eBay from competition under a trespass to chattels theory).
74 See Stiglitz, Paradigm in Economics, supra note 5, at 467; sec generally Coase, supra note
11.
76 Michael Rothschild & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Maritets:
An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. EcoN, 629, 629 (1976).
76 See generally Maureen A. O'Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on the Internet: In
Search of an Appropriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY Tem'. L.J. 561 (2001).
77 In considering this issue, one has to determine if the costs to eBay's servers are
worth the improvement in markets clearing. Alternatively, will a liability rule requiring
Bidder's Edge to compensate eBay for damage lead eBay to forgo posting its prices? And
will this result be more efficient? To the extent that price aggregation actually reduces
information asymmetries, the court's decision may have actually served to benefit markets.
The choice of legal rule has implications for how the market will develop and how transac-
tions will be structured. It may still be too early to be certain which rule will best promote
market efficiency in cyberspace. See id.
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ence or absence of a particular market affects how other markets will
function. For example, the presence of a market in data affects the
market for licensing transactions: if consumers are highly concerned
about privacy, standardized terms that give power to licensors to use
consumer information in any way may induce dishonesty and reduce
efficiencies in both markets. These cybermarkets are interlinked not
only technologically, but also informationally. Consequently, there is a
need to coordinate both types of linkages to achieve optimal social
returns. Put differently, economies of scale made possible from stan-
dardization may be much less valuable where the information market
reacts adversely to the proprietary tools that facilitate the interaction
in the first place. 78
The justification for intellectual property rights remains the same
in cyberspace despite the fundamental difference in market structure.
Like the incentive story of efficiency wage theory which states that
firms will attract better workers (or induce workers to do better work)
when they pay higher wages, the sacrosanct presumption is that grant,
ing intellectual property rights will create incentives for creators.
Rights, like wages, operate as incentives in these markets. For cyber-
space to function in equilibrium ; however, such incentives must be
given to all—and perhaps structured differently from the extant
models. Incentives only truly have their desired signaling effect if oth-
ers are able to respond with some degree of accurate information. As
discussed in Part I, however, imperfect information abounds in the
construction of proprietary rights. 79 As such, it is possible to have an
equilibrium (or multiple equilibria) where there is sonic "infringe-
ment" because narrower rights may force owners to be more creative
and, in turn, may generate more robust markets.
Studies show that the capacity of firms to exploit the benefits of
the Internet requires investment in both hardware and software. 8°
The form of protection employed by owners of the technology (such
as patent or copyright) may affect the choice of a firm to outsource
70 It is worth exploring at a later tune whether this is an effective way to analyze the vi-
ability of the open-source software movement.
7g See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying (ext.
80 Sec generally Stephen D. Oliner & Daniel E. Sichel, Computers cord Output Growth Revis-
ited: How Big Is the Puzzle? 2 BROOKINGS BA PERS ON ECONOM /C AcrivrrY 273 (1994) (exam-
ining the relationship between investments in information technology and productivity
growth); Oliver & Sichel, supra note 4, at 9-13 (updating the earlier paper and concluding
that increased efficiency gains in computer technologies and increased investments in
information technology are largely responsible for the rapid growth in the non-farm busi-
ness sector during the late 1990s).
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certain activities or to manage them internally. Where a firm chooses
the latter, the terms of a license agreement will also determine the
range of business strategies a firm may pursue.si Basically, the struc-
ture of proprietary interests and how owners choose to leverage them
in cyberspace may affect directly or indirectly each stage of a firm's
activities. Proprietary rights, then, impose additional costs on business
decisions. Where costs are sufficiently high, firms will have to seek al-
ternative ways in cyberspace to capture, increase, and maintain mar-
ket share that do not require overly high payment of returns to own-
ers of non-platform proprietary technology. Where costs are optimal,
there should be an increase in productivity and innovation measured
by Coasian bargains, 82 innovative business strategies, or a combination
of both. The ability to negotiate effectively around proprietary rights
will serve to distinguish between goods and services of competitors as
owners of technology learn to customize technology products to the
specific needs of firms and individuals. 83 The liquidity of most cyber-
space markets, customized technology, and the reduction of informa-
tion and transaction costs will enhance strategies for preserving in-
vestments in the technological infrastructure needed to participate
effectively in the information economy. 81
A large number of studies suggest that information technology is
most valuable in its complementarity with other organizational
changes within the firm, including the adoption of new business
81 Consider, for example, the controversial case MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer; Inc.,
991 F.2d 511, 513, 523-24 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding a computer maintenance company li-
able for infringement for running plaintiffs software, licensed to Peak's customers, in the
process of servicing the computers),
82 Sonic scholars are skeptical of such bargaining, particularly in the context of intel-
lectual property rights. Where proprietary rights represent only one factor of production,
however, Coasian bargaining may be feasible in the form of a division of labor between the
supplier of the technology and the user/producer of goods and services in cyberspace.
The valuation problem identified by Professor Merges may be reduced, if not completely
eliminated, where the cooperative surplus is generated in ways distinct to each party's con-
tribution to the final output. Sec Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining
Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 7, 75-76 (1994).
83 Sec Borenstein & Saloner, supra note 69, at 5 (noting the ease of customizing service
as one of the characteristics of the Internet that make it valuable for e-commerce).
84 Brynjolfsson & Hitt, supra note 4, at 24 (noting that as hardware becomes cheaper
and more efficient, business value will be located in the ability of managers to "invent new
processes, procedures and organizational structures" that make effective use of new hard-
ware capabilities); see also Susan Kelly, A Critical Relationship: Technology and the CEO, Ex-
ECUFIVE INSIGIMS, Fall 2002, at 2.
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models.85 Using old organizational models and strategies with en-
hanced capabilities of information technology has generally been tin-
successful in markedly increasing productivity. 88 If a significant por-
tion of non-farm national productivity is related to investments in new
organizational strategies, 87 as much as capital investments in informa-
tion technologies, 88 the expansive trend in intellectual property rights
as a means to foster innovation and national competitiveness hi global
markets is at least. misplaced if e-commerce is expected to significantly
expand markets. Further, some proprietary rights, particularly busi-
ness method patents which very well may encompass such organiza-
tional innovations, will in fact harm national productivity.
Consider, for example, that e-commerce is dominated by firms
that also dominate real world transactions. 88 Indeed, e-commerce has
become a shorthand for the extension of real-space power into cyber-
space, instead of a means to leverage new businesses and expand the
frontiers of existing business forms. 9° Those few firms who experi-
enced early success in cyberspace have turned predictably to intellec-
mal property rights to exclude follow-on businesses. Thus, although
small businesses may nibble around the edges of cyber-transactions,
very few will become dominant market forces in cyberspace. 81 This
outcome may not necessarily be negative, and certainly it is not un-
Seel3rynjolfsson & Hilt. supra note 4, at 30-45; Erik Brynjolfsson et al., The Matrix of
Change, 38 SLOAN Mown REV. 37,37-54 (1997); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, The Eco-
nomics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization. 80 Am. EcoN. REV.
511,526-27 (1990); see also Steven Schnoll, New Challenges Call for a Nero Business Paradigm,
EXECU'IlVE INSIGHTS, Fall 2002, at 1.
86 See Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 85, at 526-27; Brynjolfsson et at., SUpro note 85, at
37-54; see generally Brynjolfsson & Hitt, supra note 4.
+37 See Brynjolfsson & Hitt, supra note 4, at 30-45.
BB See generally °liner & Sichel, supra note 80.
69
 Sec Douglas L. Rogers. Give the Smaller Players a Chance: Shaping the Digital Economy
Through Antitrust and Copyright Law, 5 MARR, INTELL. PROP. L. REV, 13,115-16 (2001) (re-
viewing a number of intellectual property/antitrust cases and arguing for construction of
copyright law in a way that promotes competition).
98 Sec Borenstein & Salonen; supra note 69, at 3-4 (noting that traditional firms hold
significant strategic assets, including intellectual property rights, and their choices pertain-
ing to how to exploit the on-line environment will powerfully affect the shape of the mar-
ket).
91 There are a number of reasons for this, including scale and liquidity effects. The
dominance of eBay is an example of how returns to scale and liquidity are likely to lead to
only one or few markets in a particular area. As the number of participants at a site in-
crease. buyers and sellers will be drawn to that site to better their chances of realizing an
exchange, thus making the market more liquid. See Lucking-Reiley & Spann ., supra note
4, at 62; Spence, supra note 4 at 455.
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precedented in the technological history of the United States. 92
 How-
ever, it is important to identify how intellectual property rights, which
are more pervasive today than at any other time in history, might fur-
ther lower the optimal number of new businesses, inhibit investment
in organizational innovation, and eliminate incentives for firms with
large intellectual property portfolios to invest in changes that may
enhance firm output while at the same time these firms stifle compe-
tition through aggressive enforcement of intellectual property rights.
Even where large traditional firms do engage in e-commerce, the con-
struction of intellectual property rights may adversely affect optimal
levels of competitiveness between firms. 95
A few caveats are necessary. There are a number of reasons why e-
commerce has not yet fully blossomed, and I do not mean to suggest
that expansive intellectual property rights are the only, or even major,
reason.94
 Further, it is clear that intellectual property rights in cyber-
space give a competitive advantage to businesses, 95 either by providing
new avenues for distribution, facilitating new business strategies, or
enhancing existing ones. 96 This inceptive stage of e-commerce has
witnessed only incremental adaptations—using cybermarkets as sub-
stitutes for real markets. However, mere transfers of existing business
models and strategies to the on-line environment is likely to be less of
a source of increased productivity than the use of information tech-
nology tools to create new markets and to alter, fundamentally, the
way consumers and businesses interact. The regulatory emphasis for
intellectual property rights in the digital economy so far has been to
preserve established business models and organizations, not to ex-
pand them or to facilitate entry by new businesses with the possibility
92 See Patricia Buckley & Sabrina Monies, The Evolving Online Enviivnment, in DIGITAL.
ECONOMY 2002, 9, 21 (2002), at http://www.esa.doc.gov/508/esa/pdf/DE2002S1-12.pdf
(noting that nearly 1000 companies tried to market gas-powered automobiles prioi- to 1927
but only 200 survived long enough to do so—and of these, only a handful exist—btu that
handful accounts for a large share of the economy).
55 See, e.g.. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com. Inc., 73 F. Stipp. 2d. 1228
(1999), vacated and remanded, 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (lawsuit between rival online
retailers alleging infringement of Amazon's one-click method patent); see also Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, Examining State Street Bank: Developments in Business Method Patenting.
636 PLI/Pat 437, 444-52 (Feb. 2001).
94 See Buckley & Montes, supra note 92, at 12-15 (identifying some hurdles facing on-
line businesses).
TicketMaster v. Microsoft, No. 97-3055 (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 28, 1997) (alleging
trademark dilution because Microsoft included TicketMaster link on its web page without
TicketMaster's permission).
" Buckley & Montes, supra note 92, at 17-18.
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for exponential increases in productivity through new organizational
models, In part, the ill-fated Napster experiment is at least an exam-
ple of this trend.97 Further, expansive rights, to the extent that. they
signal prospects for greater market share, also misdirect capital to
ventures that, for organizational or other reasons, may not be sustain-
able over the long term. Intellectual property rights and the rights
management system of the DMCA, along with common law theories
that serve to augment, reinforce, and consolidate monopoly power
without corresponding productivity gains, have the combined effect
of inhibiting productivity and utilization of knowledge spillovers in
cyberspace in unpredictable ways.
In the classic free market model, limited exceptions are recog-
nized for government interference with a well-functioning market. 98
Of these exceptions, my argument for the need for a visible hand in
the regulation of cyberspace markets draws on the infant industry
limitation to the free market model espoused by John Stuart Mill. Ac-
cording to Mill's classic treatise, Principles of Political Economy, infant
industries are those that are unable to withstand foreign competition
without some form of protection by the government, but that with
97 I refer here primarily to the sociology of Napster as a cultural phenomenon and the
dynamics that fueled the perceptions about the legitimacy of file-sharing. Fanning, a col-
lege drop-out, wrote the source code for an application that combined a music search
function with a file sharing system. Napster, the christened name for this application,
made it possible to download digital music files from one computer to another via the
Internet without compensation. Fanning utilized the digital music standard MP3, a tech-
nology developed in 1987, as a non-proprietary method to compress CD-quality sound
files, thus enabling consumers to download digital recordings with speed and ease. Fan-
ning predicted that his application world do everything a Web application should do,
including building community, breaking down on-line barriers, and eliminating interme-
diaries, There was, at best, ambivalence in the music establishment (and other intellectual
property interests) about Napster. On the one hand, it recognized the immense economic
potential of the application, yet it was sufficiently threatened that the application was not
within its control.
In May of 2000, realizing the multiple applications for such peer-to-peer software, the
venture capital firm Hummer Winblad provided Napster with a fifteen million dollar infu-
sion of capital. The RIAA responded by filing for a petition seeking an injunction against
Napster to prohibit the company from facilitating the trading of copyrighted music files.
In July 2000, a U.S. district judge ruled in favor of the RIAA and granted the injunction
sought against Napier. On October 31, 2000, media conglomerate Bertelsmann, parent
company of BMG, a mainstay of the RIAA, structured a strategic alliance with Napster,
agreeing to loan Napster an estimated fifty million dollars its venture capital to allow Nap-
ster to develop a legal peer-to-peer file sharing system and agreed to drop out of the RIAA
lawsuit if Napster was successful.
98 For Adam Smith, these exceptions included national defense and education for the
poor Sec ADAM SIArrli, WEAL-111 or NATIONS 463-64 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., 1981).
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time, could grow and compete successfully in the global market. 99
 The
case for protectionism with regard to infant industries is attributed to
a mercantilist policy to promote domestic employment and industry.
Mill argued that government assistance to overcome entry barriers
and other obstacles associated with start-up costs is necessary for a
short time to make it possible for the public gains of a new industry to
he a viable prospect for the nation. Some of these gains include .the
creation of new wealth and capital, acquisition of new skills, and pro-
duction of new goods and services by domestic firms. 100 In addition to
the considerable debate about the legitimacy of this exception to free
trade and markets, scholars intensely debated which policy could best
support. such industries if they were to be protected. In particular, the
choice between tariffs on imports or domestic subsidies evoked con-
siderable comment. Alexander Hamilton, a strong proponent of in-
fant industry protection, preferred the use of a subsidy. 1 ° 1 Unlike tar-
iffs, subsidies do not lead to scarcity (and thus higher prices) and
subsidies have a direct effect on the industry, thus increasing the
prospects for early success. Other political economists adopted a fo-
cused theory of promoting infant industries through, for example,
government. assistance in the transfer of technology. 192 Such an excep-
tion to free trade would be justified if the domestic industry could,
with such technology, produce the goods at a comparative advantage
to foreign manufacturers.m One of the advantages of such a special-
ized exception was that greater domestic production of an imported
product would foster innovative activity and
diminish the propensity to servile imitation.... Every useful
art is so connected with so many, or with all others, that
whatever renders its products more easily attainable, facili-
tates the operation of the whole circle of arts, and introduces
change—the great agent in producing investments—under
the most favorable form.t 04
99 See generally JOFIN STUAR'I' MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLEI1CAL ECONOMY (W,J, Ashley,
ed., 1909) (1848).
1 °° See id.
1 ° 1 See generally Alexander Hamilton, Report on the Subjeet of Manufactures 117911, in THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON (Harold C. Syrett ed., vol. X 1966).
102 See generally  JoliN RAE, STATEMENT OF SOME NEW PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECON-
OMY (A.M. Kelley, Bookseller 1964) (1834).
103 See DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, AGAINS1"11IE TIDE: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF FREE
TRADE 122-24 (1996) (sonunarizing Rae's arguments).
1 " RAE, sepia note 102, at 365.
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Other economists writing from a protectionist. perspective identified
the infant industry exception as an important aspect of economic de-
velopment.m Mill's work, however, was the formal incorporation of
the infant industry exception into classical free trade theory. In later
editions of his work, Mill qualified his commitment to the infant in-
dustry exception along the same lines as patent protection.m He em-
phasized the importance of a limited duration and added an element.
of decreasing levels of protection in later years of the protection. 07
Importantly, each of the major proponents of the infant. industry ex-
ception focused on increasing domestic productive capacity and in-
novation returns that could be diffused to the society as a whole.
In the context of intellectual property rights, the initial grant
serves to address a public goods problem by creating artificial fences
around intangibles. As proprietors further expand rights by contract,
real property, and even tort rules, the signaling properties of the ini-
tial grant are weakened and the informational structure of the market
becomes more difficult to ascertain. This, in turn, raises information
and transaction costs for would-be users and producers. To the extent
that access and use are important pieces of the social value derived
from well-defined proprietary interests, this value is eliminated
through reliance by firms on extra-intellectual property rights to pre-
serve market share, hinder market creation, or in other ways stifle
competition in the e-commerce arena. 108 Consequently, courts should
severely limit recourse to penumbral common law claims.
Further, as discussed earlier, increased productivity gains in the
information era is not limited to innovation that results in a product
or service susceptible to protection through the extant intellectual
property system. Most proprietary rights are associated with techuol-
106 See, e.g.. FRIEIMICI1 Lis r. THE NATIONAL. SYSTEM OF POLMCAL ECONOMY (G.A.
Matile trans., 1856).
106 See MILL, supm note 99, at V.10.12.
The expenses of production being always greatest at first, it may happen that
the home production, though really the most advantageous, may not become
so until after a certain duration of pecuniary loss.... I have therefore con-
ceded that in a new country a temporary protecting duty may sometimes be
economically defensible; on condition, however, that it be strictly limited in
point of time, and provision be made that during the latter part of its exis-
tence it be on a gradually decreasing scale. Such temporary protection is of
the same nature as a patent, and should be governed by similar conditions.
14.
107 Sec id.
108 But seeBurk, supra note 14. at 127-32.
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ogy that provides the platform for e-commerce; these rights do not
directly contribute to productivity gains. Instead, they directly facili-
tate novel organizational changes that enhance efficiency gains inher-
ent in new technological capabilities: greater productivity and innova-
tion.o° Therefore, the reliance by traditional firms on large
intellectual property portfolios, and the expansive trend of proprie-
tary rights in the digital context, actually serve to divert investments to
less desirable objects, such as investing in rights-management systems
or other technological devices aimed al limiting access to proprietary
works. Over-reliance on proprietary rights may suggest that the rate of
on-going investment in innovation in such firms is less than optimal.
Proprietary rights thus can serve as a disincentive for firms to engage in
the organizational innovations that so 'far have been characteristic of
increased productivity in the market for information.
Additionally, over-reliance on proprietary rights as a means of
leveraging real-world advantage in cyberspace unduly burdens secon-
dary users and innovators who, free from traditional organizational
restraints, may bring the most value to the ways and strategies of utiliz-
ing the Internet to produce new goods and services. Finally, it is im-
portant that use of protected works in a manner that creates new
markets or new goods and services in the information market should
enjoy some protection from infringement claims in order to encour-
age the level of "risky" entrepreneurship that a new realm might in-
volve. The infant industry exception was in part justified by the need
to provide investors with some assistance to overcome the barriers to
entry in market creation. Greater proprietary rights to account for
shifts in externalities caused by digital technologies may be justified
by property theory, but such rights also encourage a race to the bot-
tom mentality to over-invest in "rights management" and compromise
the prospects for significantly enhancing productivity in e-commerce.
III, INFORMATION MARKETS, E-COMMERCE,
AND INTERNET REGULATION
Statistics indicate that e-commerce has not been a major con-
tributor to the national economy; although there is anticipation that
its effect will continue to grow E 1 ° In my discussion so far, I have con-
sidered proprietary rights as part of a much larger e-commerce world.
Intangible assets, such as management skills, training, and strategies
109 See, e.g., 13rynjolfsson & Hitt. supra note 4; Oliner & Sichel, supra note 4.
lit See Gordon, supra note 3, at 66-72; Oliner & Sichel, supra note 4, at 18-21.
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not covered by intellectual property rights, are the key factors to en-
hancing innovation and productivity in a world of reduced transac-
tion costs. The exercise of proprietary rights, however, can greatly af-
fect the ease with which firms can implement such organizational
models because these models incorporate technological platforms
that are subject to proprietary control. Further, as information agents,
grants of copyright or patent protection do not always send reliable
signals either to investors, users, or secondary innovators. This is par-
ticularly true in new markets.'" Thus, the case for expansive proprie-
tary rights in cyberspace, from a macroeconomic perspective, is prob-
lematic.
The use of information in markets is different from the notion of
information as the subject of a particular transaction. Both are critical
components of the efficiency of e-commerce business models: the
former reduces asymmetries between market actors and facilitates
more efficient markets, while the latter includes goods that often are
the subject of proprietary rights. Transaction costs are at least. dou-
bled when the proprietary right signals inaccurate information to us-
ers and downstream inventors, and bargaining breakdowns cannot be
avoided given the strong right given to the owner of the product. 112
The use of institutions to address transaction cost problems in real-
space may not sufficiently address the problem in cyberspace, First, as
I mentioned earlier, transaction costs are not just economic: they in-
clude the cost of inaccurate information so that payment for use when
that right is freely available for a particular instance is a social waste)"
Second, institutions tend to rely on standardized systems to enhance
efliciency." 4 The value of organizational changes in fostering the cr
ber-economy may require a flexibility in license terms that suggest
that standardization might. create barriers for some firms, or facilitate
exit by others where the costs are sufficiently high.
If proprietary interests make use of information costly, or impos-
sible, there certainly will be an adverse effect. on the market for cyber-
space. One could suggest that this simply means that proprietary
rights should be weaker in cyberspace. The story, however, is more
complex than this. It suggests that the structure of proprietary inter-
ests needs to be re-examined to determine how to maximize the
11 ' The dotcom bust is the most vivid example of the failure of new markets.
112 See Merges, supra note 82, at 7547; Merges, supra note 21, at 2659-60.
118 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
114 See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
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benefits of property rights and the potential of the Internet to create
new markets in user experiences, products, and services.
The global nature of the Internet raises important challenges for
how governments may choose to interfere with markets in cyberspace,
particularly with respect to the allocation and construction of proprie-
tary rights. Governments cannot unilaterally contain strategic choices
made to enhance competitive welfare in domestic markets by restruc-
turing proprietary rights in cyberspace. Unilateral national changes in
this regard may have some initial adverse consequences for domestic
firms and innovation. Thus, nations should consider coordinated pol-
icy responses in these areas, particularly competition laws.
Among industrialized countries, significant differences exist in
competition policies, information polices, and levels of R & D invest-
ment. Each of these regulatory schemes interact with innovative activ-
ity to yield optimal levels of productivity'. These differences also con-
tribute uniquely to the comparative advantage of each nation, thus
suggesting that harmonizing the innovation regime is, at the very
least, impracticable."5 In some aspects, it is important for nations to
be able to fashion rules that benefit their own domestic e-commerce
economies, while maintaining a framework that encourages regula-
tory cooperation. In this regard, international law offers some lessons.
International law demonstrates that it is possible, and expected,
that nations should control acts/behavior that are considered delete-
rious to their national well-being or laws. Indeed, numerous examples
of these "controls" with regard to cyberspace already exist." 6 Further,
the very existence of cyberspace is a reflection of common techno-
logical standards----"protocols"—that make it possible for interaction
to occur. between millions of users. The existence of a common tech-
nological language suggests that coordination games between nations
and private "sovereigns" are indispensable for the viability of the
Internet. For example, both the TRIPS Agreement and the WIPO
Treaties are significant complementary legal protocols that are based
on the current technological structure of the Internet." 7 Certainly,
U.S. implementation of the WIPO treaties indicates a supposition that
the extant legal and technical design will (or should) remain the
same so that owners may control their property interests in any way
115 But see Diane P. Wood, International Harmonization of Antitrust Law: The Tortoise or the
Hare?, 3 Cm. J. IN•1"1. L. 391, 405-07 (2002) (arguing for harmonization in the antitrust
context).
116 See supra notes 26-27.
17 See generally Neianel, supra note 31.
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necessary. 118 The controversial anti-device and anti-circumvention
provisions of the DMCA serve as the tools of such preservation.) l9
The very existence of a protocol indicates that standardization is
desirable in the social design of cyberspace, and that the conditions
for exclusion are inherent in this design. 120 Exclusion in this regard
will not necessarily follow the traditional patterns of protection versus
access. Indeed, I suggest that the coordination games, because they
involve so many actors in different geographic regions, will facilitate
some distributive efficiencies that will permeate orthodox barriers
that have a tendency to exclude or marginalize individuals based on
class, social status, or geographic location."' A maximalist construc-
tion of intellectual property rights tinder new treaties, however, may
erode such efficiency gains. In this regard, countries may raise sover-
eignty claims to facilitate bargaining around the minimum standards
of the TRIPs Agreement to localize the effect of maximalist construe-
tion. 122 Further, the presence of institutions designed to encourage
compliance with evolving norms in cyberspace will not sufficiently en-
sure such compliance. Compliance with cyberlaw, as with interna-
tional law, will depend on an aggregation of interests structured to
create incentives and to maximize payoffs for a majority of the players.
Thus, cyberspace, despite its seeming detachment from real-space
constraints, is likely to be increasingly dependent on real-space insti-
tutions to sustain the tools that have molded its current shape.
Perhaps the most important lesson of international law for cyber-
space is that the fundamental assumptions that govern the regulation
of intellectual property rights may reveal biases that produce out-
comes that we would otherwise not tolerate in a liberal market econ-
omy. It leaves us with the challenge that we may need to reconstruct
intellectual property rights, as the currency of cyberspace, in a way
that helps accomplish the constitutional goals of "progress" by elevat-
118 Sec id.
119 See l u .S.C.§ 1201 (1998).
120 Kenneth J. Arrow, Higher Education as Filter: 2 J. OF PUBLIC ECON. 193 (1973) (noting
that the use of standards (such as exams) to convey information in a market with assump-
tions of competitive equilibrium results in gains by the more able made at the expense of
the weaker, less able individuals).
121 For a recent empirical study of factors of growth internationally, see generally
Subodh Kumar & R. Robert Russell, Technological Change, Technological Catch-Up, and Capital
Deepening: Relative Contributions to Growth and Convergence, 92 AM. ECON. REV, 527 (2002).
122 Professor Jerome Reichman has suggested, for example, that developing countries
exploit the indeterminate standards in the TRIPs Agreement to implement rights in a way
that is sensitive to the public interest, See J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers:
Global Competition tinder the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.V.U. J. IN1'L L. Pot., 11,16-17 (1997).
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ing the twin values of freedom per se and freedom of commerce. Fi-
nally, international law teaches us that cyberlaw is not a unitary or iso-
lated set of norms and legal prescriptions. Instead, the regulation of
cyberspace will consist of a complementary collage of regulatory sys-
tems in a variety of subject areas to ensure that we maximize welfare
in cyberspace. This will require courts to understand both the tech-
nology at issue and also the way information technology has altered
our traditional notions of "markets" and how they function.
CONCLUSION
The expansion of intellectual property rights, particularly the
endorsement of business method patents,'" has uncannily extended a
historical project124 whose discourse focused on distance and differ-
ence to justify control and domination to an ultra-modern techno-
logical medium that relies on proprietary control to justify deference
to efforts to strengthen rights and legitimize efforts to exclude access
by others. The dominant laissez-faire model of international trade has
been extended to e-commerce, suppressing close scrutiny of informa-
tional changes that information markets have occasioned in transac-
tions in cyberspace. For example, prior to the Internet, firms enjoyed
some protection from price competition where search costs were high
and firms could not easily ascertain the expected benefits of finding a
lower price. 125 When prices are posted on the Internet, however, such
protection is effectively eliminated. This in turn puts pressure on the
firm in deciding whether to post the price in the first instance. 126
Choosing not to post prices on the Internet, however, may eliminate
some of the benefits that accrue from liquidity and reactivate transac-
tion costs for buyers and sellers. As a regulatory matter then, proprie-
tary interests should not be construed in a manner that impedes the
ability of buyers to reduce search costs for the lowest price. The result-
ing increase in competition will foster creative business strategies that
125 See supra note 24.
124
 Most are familiar with the origins of the Internet as a product of the Cold War
years; both international law and cyberspace developed as responses to existing "natural"
limitations on the ability of sovereigns to control what occurred within and without their
borders. Thus, the development of the Internet was a preemptive resort to self-help/self-
defense—the ultimate obligation and right of states to defend their geographical bounda-
ries.
125 See Spence, supra note 4, at 455.
126
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may spawn even greater benefits in the form of new business models
or organizational structures and improved e-market performance.
